Northern Ireland is in the early stages of transition from conflict, but progress is regularly affected by political and public discontent. A divided landscape, segregated and underresourced communities are enduring legacies of 'the Conflict'.
executive estates (public housing) in Belfast comprise of more than 80 per cent of one community/ cultural group (Shuttleworth and Lloyd 2007) . Further, 66 per cent of Northern
Ireland's population live in areas where most neighbours share the same religious background (Shirlow 2003) . Hamilton et al. (2008, 20-21) note that quantifying segregation tends to mask geographical differences, over-simplifying it as a working class issue and implying greater physical distance from 'the other' community than is the reality. In some areas single identity communities are located close to each other, or alongside mixed-identity middle class areas (Boal 1982) . Visible illustrations of the spatial division of the two main ethno-national groups include murals, flags, painted curbstones and 'peacewalls' 3 . There is no indication that residential segregation has diminished significantly since the signing of the 1998 Good Friday/ Belfast Agreement (Shuttleworth and Lloyd 2008) . Indeed, the number and height of peacewalls have increased (McDonald 2009 ).
Further demonstrating the pervasiveness of community divisions, 94 per cent of the school-aged population attend segregated education in de facto Catholic or Protestant nursery, primary or post-primary schools (DENI 2008, 2) . 'Basic daily routines' such as the use of social space, sports played and supported, festivals and cultural events attended, and choice of newspaper, 'are structured by the dominant sectarian divisions of Northern Irish society' (Hamilton et al. 2008, 11) . Through fear, tradition or habit, exclusive places and practices have persisted over time, resulting in 'mutual avoidance' (Larsen 1982 (Larsen , cited in 2005 . Some young people refuse to attend colleges or training courses in particular areas because of their location and perceived identity (Hamilton et al. 2008 ).
The 2011 Young Life and Times survey of 16-year olds across Northern Ireland indicates that 'there has been an increase in cross-community contact over recent years' with cross-community friendship more common in 2011 than reported in the 2003 survey, although 22 per cent reported they had no friends from the other main religious community (Devine and Robinson 2012) . In the 2012 survey, six out of ten respondents considered leisure centres, parks and libraries 'shared and open' to both Catholics and Protestants but 45
per cent said there were no facilities in their area where they could meet with people of a different religion (Devine, 2013) . Inevitably, lack of contact and mistrust prevent children and young people learning about the other's culture.
Segregation, sectarianism and identity
The impact of segregation on the development of children's identity in Northern
Ireland has been the focus of research drawing on social psychological theories (e.g. Cairns
1987
; Gallagher and Cairns 2011; Trew 1992) . Employing primarily quantitative, experimental methods with school-based samples, studies have focused on the age-related development of attitudes and understandings about national identity, particularly children's understand of difference, 'preference' for their own cultural group and prejudice towards 'the other'. Social Identity Theory (SIT), for example, suggests that identity is shaped through group belonging. It proposes that comparison with 'other' groups strengthens positive 'ingroup' identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986) . In conflict-affected and divided societies, strong 'in-group' identification has been associated with 'out-group' prejudice (see Trew 2004) .
Social Identity Development Theory (SIDT) suggests that, as children identify more with the 'in-group', they adopt negative attitudes and stereotypes about the 'out-group' (Gallagher and Cairns 2011) . This is influenced by the degree to which children internalise the prejudices of the 'in-group' and feel threatened by the 'out-group' (Barrett and Oppenheimer 2011) . The relationships between strength of national identity, 'out-group' attitudes and perceived threats to identity are important in a society in transition from conflict where ethno-national identities are dominant. However, Brewer (1999, 431) questions the implication of a 'negative reciprocal relationship between ingroup and outgroup attitudes'.
She notes that a strong positive attitude to one's own group does not always equate with prejudice towards 'out-groups'. Indeed, she suggests that some show indifference to the 'outgroup' or that their feelings of 'superiority' manifest in avoidance rather than conflict. In the context of Northern Ireland, some children and young people are so 'cocooned' in segregated communities that 'the other community' has no relevance to them (see Roche 2008) .
In studies of children's 'intergroup' attitudes and national identities, the research setting and highly structured methods of data collection can limit opportunities for personal explanations, conceal the complexities of children's and young people's lives, and limit the focus of analysis to pre-determined themes (see Connolly and Healy 2003) , locating attitudes and beliefs in individual psycho-social development. In contrast, critical analysis takes the socioeconomic and political contexts of children's and young people's lives as its starting point.
Recognising that identity is formed and re-formed through interpersonal relationships and interactions in social institutions, it examines the routine processes and activities of children's everyday lives -those contexts, events and processes that shape and delimit their experiences (see Shirlow 2003) . White and Wyn (2008, 191) state that identity 'is always contingent upon immediate social circumstance, the weight of historical factors, and the agency of young people themselves', emphasising the significance of listening to children's and young people's personal accounts. This is central to understanding their beliefs, experiences and responses to the Conflict, segregation, sectarianism and identity. Our research indicates that the social, cultural and political contexts of children's and young people's lives play a significant role in their sense of cultural identity and their views of 'the other'. In examining how social and personal contexts inform attitudes, identities and experiences, the 'community' context is focal.
Communities in conflict
The relationship between poverty and conflict, and experiences of Conflict-related violence within particular communities,are complex. Hillyard et al. (2003) report a direct association between experiences of the Conflict and poor socio-economic circumstances. They found that those areas that had endured higher levels of conflict-related violence had also experienced greater poverty. Violence, death and injury were concentrated in the poorest communities, defined by the prevalence of ill-health, limited educational and employment opportunities, lower provision of services and less economic investment (Save the Children, 2007). Noting that poverty does not cause conflict, Horgan (2011, 456) maintains that 'conflict feeds on poverty while undermining the potential for those living in it to escape it'.
Despite their difficult histories, communities are often galvanised and strengthened through challenging conflict and segregation (Leonard 2004; Smyth 2000) . Cattell (2001) also notes that strong perceptions and experiences of inequality can be a uniting and/or empowering force in areas of deprivation. In some instances, communities separated by conflict are characterised by high levels of social cohesion, strong community identity and feelings of safety (Murtagh 2002) . The withdrawal of services from marginalised communities has stimulated community support and infrastructure as a necessity (McAlister, Scraton, and Haydon 2009 ). Leonard's (2004, 931) research in a high conflict area of Belfast found 'strong community networks and a self-help ethos'. She explains this as a consequence of the community's experiences during the Conflict, when economic and social disadvantage stemmed from 'political discrimination and the suppression of identity' (ibid.).
difference. It is constituted and experienced as shared among community members, distinguishing them from other communities. However, Suttles (1972, 51) notes that neighbourhood identities are constructed in a 'contrastive structure', with 'relative differences' more significant than shared characteristics among those within the same neighbourhood. This is relevant in Northern Ireland given that the only commonality shared within a community may be religious background (i.e. some may not identify as Unionist or Nationalist, or as British or Irish, but their religious inheritance and socialisation define their cultural and political identity). Given that 'place is standing for a set of cultural characteristics', it 'says something not only about where you live or come from but who you are' (Crang 1998, 103) . In Northern Ireland, the physical and symbolic marking of community space is a defining, visual message of community and cultural identity. While communities can be places of support, belonging and safety, they can also signify hostility, fear and exclusion.
Progress and political context
Signed in 1998 the Good Friday/ Belfast Agreement signalled the potential for 'normalisation' in a jurisdiction steeped in civil and political violence. While setbacks occurred, the establishment of a devolved administration and shared political power, the renaming and restructuring of the police force and a review of criminal justice, symbolised moves toward enacting the core principles of the Agreement -transparency, equality, rights and social justice. Given a significant reduction in sectarian violence and the opening of public space, the night-time economy expanded, tourism grew and, until the recent economic crisis, there were visible signs of economic rejuvenation. Commenting on Belfast and the depoliticisation of space, Murtagh (2008, 9) notes:
For a city whose recent imagery has been built on violence, peace lines and fear, the formation of low risk, glitzy and speculator investment sites has been a vital strategy in normalization and place marketing.
Yet persistent low level and localised violence continues, particularly in interface areas. There is recognition that 'post-conflict' Belfast is a 'twin speed city' (Murtagh 2008 is unsurprising that Northern Ireland has been described as experiencing 'cold peace' or 'peace-without-reconciliation', portrayed as a place 'stuck in a model that reinforces the traditional divisions' (Nolan 2012, 16) . Northern Ireland's first peace monitoring report also noted the fragility of peace and the vulnerability of working class young men to involvement in violence (Nolan 2012) .
Research context and methods
While the external face of formal politics has promoted 'peace' and the significance of Northern Ireland as an exemplar of conflict transformation, there is a strong sense in the child and youth sector that this representation masks the reality of sectarian politics and the continuing impact on children and their families of living in a divided society (Kilkelly et al, 2004) . The research on which this paper is founded arose from the identified need to explore in depth children's and young people's experiences of political and economic marginalisation in the context of the legacy of conflict. The research was conducted in communities profoundly affected by poverty, sectarianism and violence during 2008, a decade after the signing of the Good Friday/ Belfast Agreement.
Qualitative research (combining interviews, focus groups and observation) was conducted in six communities, one in each of Northern Ireland's six counties. Each community had endured relatively high levels of poverty combined with Conflict-related violence including bereavement, internment and/or imprisonment. The communities were both urban and rural. Five were predominantly Catholic/ Nationalist/ Republican or Protestant/ Unionist/ Loyalist. One was 'mixed', although its internal boundaries were clearly demarcated and there was virtually no integration.
In piloting the research framework, preliminary focus groups were held with 25 young people in four locations across Northern Ireland. Their involvement at the formative stage of the research contributed significantly to the authenticity of the research as child/ young people centred. The researchers interviewed 65 'community representatives' to establish specific historical context and build trust in communities wary of outsiders. These representatives included community members/ residents and community workers. The latter, some of whom lived in the community, were interviewed in their role as teachers and afterschool workers, community development workers, youth workers, children and family service workers, police. Following these 'scene-setting' interviews, focus groups and interviews were conducted with 196 children and young people aged 8-25, accessed primarily through community-based schemes and youth workers. Given the controversial and often personal research topics (relationships; education; employment; place and identity; segregation and sectarianism; violence; community; policing; services and support), it was decided that accessing children and young people through schools would constrain both access and dialogue.
The qualitative research reflects the dynamics of 'personal/ familial' and 'social/ cultural' relations within economically marginalised and conflict-affected communities undergoing transition from conflict. Such dynamics are prescribed through the intervention of state agencies, particularly policing, social care, housing and schooling. As the research progressed, three key tensions emerged: expressions of insecurity and fear post-ceasefire; young people's sectarian and violent behaviour; the marginalisation and silencing of children and young people within communities. What follows explores culture, identity and 'belonging' as key priorities for children and young people, juxtaposed with adult community members' views about 'lack of policing' and weak social regulation.
Communities in transition
The six communities involved in the research included areas of relocation for families exiled from their homes elsewhere, residential locations for police and security forces, and Perceptions about lack of progress were intensified by a growing sense of regression, uncertainty and instability:
'[the area] has improved in some ways but has deteriorated in others. There is more violence post-conflict. People don't feel safe in this community when they always did in the past.' (Community worker)
This was a commonly expressed view on both sides of the political divide. The perception of increased violence and a corresponding increase in fear and insecurity was palpable, despite a significant decline in paramilitary violence, informal punishment beatings and exiling.
Policing and transition
The decline in paramilitary regulation within communities, alongside the reduction in violence, has resulted in an increased presence of young people in public spaces. Rather than being viewed as 'progress', this was raised by community representatives as a concern across the six communities -reflecting a generic concern in Northern Ireland about the physical presence of young people 'on the streets' (McAlister, Scraton, and Haydon 2011). Sometimes combined with heavy drinking, young people occasionally were involved in violent behaviour. This informed community members' views about lack of safety. They believed that loosening the grip of informal, paramilitary control had allowed the streets to be reclaimed by 'anti-social' and 'threatening' children and young people.
Despite identifying the negative impact of violence and paramilitary regulation when explaining the history of their areas, community members discussing current concerns often addressed the past with nostalgia. Previously described as the most difficult years for communities, they were presented as a time when parents controlled their children and paramilitaries 'policed, for the most part, with compassion' (Community member). The reality was that children and young people had been kept indoors, their use of public space The police were either unwilling to intervene or unwelcome in communities where a history of mistrust existed as a result of personal, family or community experiences. Among some community members, there was resentment towards the previous 'protectors' who had withdrawn their control while actively discouraging co-operation with the police.
Considering this to be a consequence of external political agreements without community consultation, community members felt they had been left unsupported to deal with unacceptable or anti-social behaviour by young people:
'The police are not there and the paramilitaries will do nothin' about it. Young people have no fear so they behave as they like.' (Community member)
'If something happens now, you feel you have nowhere to go.' (Community member)
Given their recent history of differential policing, the expectation that Nationalist/ Republican communities would willingly accept, trust and work with the police was unrealistic. Thus a 'policing void' had consolidated:
'There is much confusion among people in these communities -they can't trust the police and they can't trust the men in their own communities. So they are left in a noman's land.' (Community worker)
Former 'protectors' were also less visible and active in Unionist/ Loyalist communities.
There was a reticence to involve the police in local issues for fear of reprisal: 'the fear factor is a legacy of the conflict' (Community worker). Some expressed the view that the powers of the 'new' police force in Northern Ireland, re-branded as the Police Service of Northern
Ireland (PSNI -previously the Royal Ulster Constabulary) under the terms of the Good
Friday/ Belfast Agreement, had been weakened considerably by compliance with human rights:
'Human rights have taken over. The police regulated in the past but can't do it now, they can't break up a group of lads [standing on the street].' (Community member)
These views of policing were rooted in contrasting experiences and perceptions between communities. While many in Catholic/ Nationalist/ Republican communities believed the police continued to represent the interests of the Protestant/ Unionist/ Loyalist communities, many in the latter considered that the discourse of human rights had given advantage to the former.
Partly because of increased visibility, and partly because of how some dealt with change -manifested in violence towards others or themselves -young people were the focus of adult concern. There was a sense that frustrations were simmering and could boil over at any time: 'Something will ignite it … and it will erupt' (Community member). In some communities there was a feeling of despondency: 'everyone washes their hands of these young people -there is a paralysis in dealing with young people' (Community worker).
enemy', the outsider, adults across the six communities shared fear of, and hostility towards, 'the enemy within' -young people from their neighbourhoods.
Identities in transition
Concerns were also expressed about sectarian and territorial attitudes or behaviour of children and young people. Older residents, in particular, found this difficult to understand given the 'new' context of 'peace' and the fact that young people had 'never lived through the Those who work closely with children and young people recognise these tensions.
Within the research, many considered that young people, young men in particular, were confused by the mixed messages generated by the transition from conflict. Having been socialised into strong cultural identities -which they were expected to defend, sometimes through violence -past expectations had been reversed. Previously accepted behaviour and/or responses were no longer tolerated:
'There are confusing messages for young people. Now adults are saying "Don't do that [support 'the cause']", when in the past they were told to do it.' (Community worker)
Working class young men with strong cultural and community identities experienced a collective sense of loss -there were no jobs, education was not valued and there were few alternative prospects (see also Lloyd 2009 ). This was echoed across the communities:
'It was always in the heads of these young men, "We're tough, we're from [name of area]". They had an image, now they're not allowed that. It has been taken away and nothing has replaced it. They were something in the past and now they're not.' Community representatives described how 'local hard men' politicised young people through glorifying the past and propagating the notion that their politicians had 'sold out'. Labelled locally as 'armchair paramilitaries', they were rarely visible but preying on young people;
feeding their fears and emphasising their vulnerabilities. In situations where young people's role and identity were uncertain, where there were few opportunities, they were considered 'easy to drag in and give a focus in their lives' (Community worker). The continuing recruitment of children and young people into violent sectarianism, often in the guise of celebrating cultural tradition or protecting cultural identity, remains a crucial issue inhibition in communities working towards positive cross-community relations.
Children and young people within communities in transition
Analysis of the community representatives' often contradictory views regarding the position of children and young people reveals a generation pulled in opposing directions. First, by politicians who expect a shift from use of violence to achieve objectives towards politically negotiated solutions. Second, by community 'hardliners' who 'keep the pot boiling'(Community worker). Some recognised that communities were unprepared for change and consequently 'nothing was ever explained to young people -policing was never explained, change was never explained' (Community worker). While some young people struggled to retain or reclaim an identity and sense of belonging, in so doing they had become feared and shunned within their neighbourhoods.
Although many adults considered children and young people to be disconnected from their communities, this was challenged by young people. They demonstrated strong attachments to their communities and their concerns were similar to those of adults. Yet they felt distrusted, disrespected and disliked within their neighbourhoods, considered a problem from which the community wished to be free: 'People aren't bothered with us, they just want us out of their area … but it's our area as well' (Young people, aged 16-21). Rather than being places of inclusion and belonging, for some young people their communities were places of exclusion.
There was recognition that young people should be 'better connected to community life' (Community worker). Beyond youth work provision, however, few formal efforts were made to attain this objective. Consistent with the separation of the two main ethno-national Exclusion from community decision-making processes was instructive to young people, demonstrating that their views were inconsequential, that adults were unwilling to listen, and that they were not valued as community members.
The negative behaviour of some young people led to their collective demonisation within their neighbourhoods. They were labelled and defined as a 'problem', separate from rather than integral to the community. There were calls for more authoritarian responses to what was labelled 'unacceptable' or 'anti-social' behaviour. Yet there was some understanding of the difficulties faced by young people in the transition from conflict and towards adulthood in communities offering limited opportunities. Ironically, experiences of marginalisation had led some young people to engage in the very anti-social activities that caused concern to adults.
Conclusion
While the external perception of Northern Ireland is a society that has emerged successfully from three decades of war, the impact of the Conflict continues. The broadly proclaimed peace dividend was not evident in the views of children, young people, community members and workers who participated in the research. Frustration, anger and resentment were voiced regarding the rhetoric of 'peace' and claims for 'progress'. The research found that the six economically disadvantaged communities deeply affected by the Conflict were attempting to address its legacy with inadequate resources.
In their narratives of community life, three broad tensions and contradictions emerged: increased feelings of insecurity despite a decline in violence; adult concerns about the sometimes sectarian and violent behaviour of young people while failing to consider its context; strong community and cultural identities among young people yet a tendency for them to be marginalised and demonised. Young people who occupied social spaces previously denied because of fears about their safety or paramilitary regulation of their behaviour were condemned as 'anti-social'. Their presence on the streets was often perceived as threatening community stability and instilling fear in older people. This encouraged further demonisation, alienating young people from their communities.
Young people and community workers noted that many young people were confused about their cultural identity. Working class young men retained a strong cultural and community identity yet they experienced a collective sense of loss. Erosion of work and social opportunities, coupled with perceived threats to their cultural identity, particularly in Protestant/ Unionist/ Loyalist communities, brought angry responses. Some young people asserted their sectarian identity to defend a way of life and a culture they believed was being eroded. This was exacerbated by a commonly-held belief that their exclusion was deliberate, manifested in failure to invite their participation in community decision-making processes.
While young people resented what they viewed as discriminatory policing, through which they were targeted on the streets solely because of age, community members raised concern about a 'policing vacuum' and 'withdrawal' of paramilitary regulation of young people's challenging behaviour. The research revealed, however, that the behind-the-scenes presence of former paramilitaries, and the emergence of quasi-paramilitaries, generated a climate in which violence could occur at any time. This was fuelled by the consolidation of discontent with the peace process.
The critical research ensured that participants could discuss issues in their own terms, explain their views or behaviours and key influences. This revealed a nuanced account of segregation and sectarianism in contemporary Northern Ireland. Despite claims for progress towards cross-community association, the lives of children and young people within the six communities were defined by division. Schooling, housing and leisure facilities remained deeply segregated, ensuring inter-community and territorial hostility. Sectarian clashes provided the opportunity to assert and display cultural identity, often cloaked as a response to perceived inequalities. It is an irony that some adults who condemned the anti-social behaviour of young people within their community actively encouraged violence and aggression when this was directed outside the community against the 'other'.
